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I. INTRODUCTION
A significant and increasing percentage of international interbank
fund transfers are now transmitted electronically.' Two organizations
process the majority of electronic funds transfers ("EFrs"): the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications ("SWIFT") 2
and the New York Clearinghouse Association's Clearinghouse Interbank
Payments System ("CHIPS").3 Neither of these organizations is cur-
rently subject to any international regulation,4 and courts consistently
I Banking Technology: The Interbank Networks, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1982, at 128 [hereinafter
Banking Technology].
2 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications ("SWIFT') is a private
organization composed of over 1000 member banks worldwide, and acting exclusively as a commu-
nication or message switching network for its members. N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, THE LAW OF
ELEcTRONIC FUND TRANSFER SYsTEMS 24.02(l)(b)(1980 & Supp. 1985). SWIFT members set-
tle fund transfers through the use of corresponding bank account relationships, and SWIFT itself
merely transmits instructions. SWIFI does not itself transfer the money from one bank to another.
See Comment, The Courts and CHIPS, SWIFT& FED WIRE: A Proposal for Filling the Regulatory
Gap, 2 INT'L PROP. INv. J. 271, 276-79 (1984)[hereinafter Comment, Filling the Gap]; Comment,
Risk Allocation in International Interbank Electronic Fund Transfers: CHIPS & SWIFT, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 621, 622-26 (198 1)[hereinafter Comment, Risk Allocation].
3 The New York Clearinghouse Association's Clearinghouse Interbank Payments System
("CHIPS") differs substantially from SWIFT. See supra note 2. CHIPS, as its full name suggests, is
a clearinghouse through which transfers are actually effectuated and settled. Settlement of transfers
takes place at the end of each day through a special deposit account created exclusively for CHIPS
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 628-29.
Transferor banks (those in a debit position with regard to EFTs processed that day) must pay money
into the Federal Reserve account, and transferee banks (banks in a credit position) receive money
from the Federal Reserve account. Id. CHIPS is responsible for about 90% of all international
interbank funds transfers; it is also estimated that the SWIFT communications network handles
about 75% of the messages involved in this clearing procedure. Byler & Baker, SWIFT. A Fast
Method to Facilitate International Financial Transactions, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 458, 461-62
(1983).
4 Both CHIPS and SWIFT handle domestic transfers as well as international transfers. Domes-
tic transfers may be subject to national regulatory measures, but these measures generally do not
apply to international transfers. For example, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act .("EFTA"), 15
U.S.C. § 1393 (1980), regulates only consumer transactions, not corporate EFT transactions. Com-
ment, Filling the Gap, supra note 2, at 291-92. See generally Tallackson & Vallejo, International
Commercial Wire Transfers The Lack of Standards, I1 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639 (1986).
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apply common law principles in resolving disputes arising from interna-
tional EFTs.5
The most common disputes arising from international EFTs involve
failures or delays in transfers, or a combination of the two.6 Losses at-
tributable to these breaches or delays may include losses to principal,
interest losses due to delayed receipt of transferred funds, and losses re-
sulting from foreign exchange rate fluctuations between the expected and
actual time of receipt.7 Resolution of these disputes requires the determi-
nation of party liability and culpability for the losses.
While several proposals exist to attach principal and interest loss
liability variously to the parties involved in the transfers,8 no proposal
has yet considered the losses attributable to fluctuating exchange rates.9
For a comparison of domestic EFTs and corporate EFTs, see Trotter, Is Corporate EFT Coming of
Age?, 2 COMP. L.J. 87 (1983).
5 See generally Comment, New SWIFT Rules on the Liability of Financial Institutions for Inter-
est Losses Caused by Delay in International Fund Transfers, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 311, 315-20
(1980)[hereinafter Comment, New SWIFT Rules]; Tallackson & Vallejo, supra note 4, at 639-66;
Comment, Filling the Gap, supra note 2, at 290.
6 Among other things, liability may result from: 1) improper transmissions; 2) erroneous infor-
mation supplied by a participating bank or the central system (CHIPS or SWIFT); or 3) a partici-
pant's inability to settle the day's transactions. See Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 630-
31; N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 2, at 24-26. The failure to settle is usually caused by the
insolvency of either the transmitting or receiving bank. Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at
631-44. Delays and faulty information may arise from systems failure, fraud, negligence, or force
majeure. Id.
Force majeure results when "a part of the contract cannot be performed due to causes which are
outside the control of the parties and could not be avoided by exercise of due care." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979). Losses due to force majeure are common when a country under-
goes a violent change in leadership. Most recently, exchange losses were found to have been due to
force majeure when the communist takeover of South Vietnam caused closings of branches of United
States banks. See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhatten Bank, 754 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985); Trinh v.
Citibank, 623 F. Supp. 1526 (D.C. Mich. 1985).
7 Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 630. Losses may also include consequential dam-
ages. See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1981)(consequential damages
recoverable), rev'd, 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
8 See Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 631-33 (liability should be allocated according
to principles of economic efficiency); Comment, Filling the Gap, supra note 2, at 290-301 (procedural
and substantive review should be implemented to insure cost-effectiveness in liability allocation); see
also SOCIETY FOR WORLDWIDE INTERBANK FINANCIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, USER HAND-
BOOK § 7 (1981)(incorporating Special Newsletter: Responsibility and Liability (SWIFT Board Pa-
per 185, Apr. 1979))[hereinafter SWIFT USER HANDBOOK].
9 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") recently rec-
ognized that "[w]ith exchange rates currently fluctuating daily, customer claims for reimbursement
of exchange losses arising out of late payments are a more frequent occurrence." Report of the
Secretary General: Electronic Funds Transfer, reprinted in 1982 U.N.Y.B. 276, 283, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/221 [hereinafter Secretary General's Report]. It was ultimately concluded, however, that "[i]t
would be premature ... to attempt to unify the law in respect of electronic fund transfers at present
. ...." Id. This conclusion was based on the finding that "technology and the associated banking
practices are rapidly changing, threatening to make obsolete any new legal rules which might be
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It has been suggested that the SWIFT rules on allocation of interest
losses might be extended to cover exchange losses,10 but no such exten-
sion has occurred to date. Moreover, these rules would be inadequate to
deal with exchange losses.1 ' While extending the SWIFT rules would be
useful in determining who should carry the risk of exchange loss, 2 such
rules do not provide a means to determine the extent of liability for such
losses.' 3 As a result, even if the SWIFT rules were extended to govern
exchange loss disputes, additional provisions specifically tailored to the
exchange loss problem would still be needed.
This Comment suggests that uniform international rules dealing
with the EFT exchange loss problem would improve and facilitate dis-
pute resolution in this area. A uniform rule of law, if properly formu-
lated, could be expected to reduce float, 4 forum shopping, and risk
speculation in the courts. Most importantly, uniform rules would pro-
vide all parties involved in EFTs-including the transferor, the trans-
feree, the clearinghouses (such as CHIPS), and the message switching
networks (such as SWIFT)-with certainty as to the circumstances and
extent of their potential liabilities.'"
An essential element in allocating liabilities for exchange rate fluctu-
ation losses under a uniform rule is the establishment of "time of pay-
developed even before they come into force .... " Id. Apparently, the United Nations advocates
that each and every country having banks engaging in foreign interbank fund transfers develop its
own laws to deal with the peculiar legal issues involved in EFTs. Such an approach can only add to
the confusion.
10 Polo, The Quality of Today's International Transfers, in SOCIETY OF WORLDWIDE INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS, SWIFT INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS
SEMINAR 1981 117 (1981)[hereinafter SIBOS '81]; Comment, New SWIFT Rules, supra note 5, at
325-26; Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 636.
11 See infra notes 81-115 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
14 In general banking practice, float has been defined as "[t]he time between when a check is
written and when such check is actually deducted from bank account." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
576 (5th ed. 1979). In the context of EFTs, this definition can be interpreted as describing the time
between when a transfer is sent and when it is credited to the transferee's bank account. Both the
transferor and the intermediary network can benefit by float. If the intermediary does not deduct
from the transferor's account until payment is accepted by the transferee, the transferor has use of
the transfer money during this float time. If the intermediary deducts from the transferor's account
when the transfer is initiated and credits the transferee's account when accepted, the intermediary
has use of the money during this period. However short this period may be, when all transfers are
aggregated the potential interest and exchange gains to the floating parties and losses to the transfer-
ees are staggering. Uniform rules allocating liability for this float activity can be expected to reduce
its prevalence.
15 Float would be reduced as parties to an EFT would be deterred from delaying a transfer due
to sanctions imposed by the rules. Choice of forum activity would be reduced as all rules would be
universally applied without regard to the forum. Certainty would be provided simply because all
EFTs would be employing the same rules of law.
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ment." 16 Interest loss cases are analogous, as time of payment must be
determined to establish the point from which interest is to be accrued.
The calculation of interest damages, however, depends only on the length
of the delay. 17 Once this time is established, interest in any jurisdiction
can be computed from the time of expected performance to the time of
actual payment. In contrast, the calculation of exchange losses involves
a comparison between exchange rates at the time of expected perform-
ance and at actual performance. Determining time of payment alone dic-
tates only what has already been paid. 8 The loss due to the exchange
rate differential between the time of expected and actual payment must
still be determined.
Depending on the jurisdiction in which suit is brought, foreign cur-
rency damage determinations may be based on the law of the chosen
forum,' 9 the forum chosen by contract,2 ° or a contractual provision
placing risk of loss on a particular party to the transfer.21 Further,
different jurisdictions may require that judgments be paid in a particular
currency,22 with different rules regarding applicable exchange rates.23 A
16 The determination of time of payment actually involves two questions: "First, when does the
sending bank become bound to its payment message? Second, when, if ever, may the bank receiving
the message to pay refuse to honor the payment request?" Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2,
at 651. See also Secretary General's Report, supra note 9. See generally Comment, New SWIFT
Rules, supra note 5, at 318; N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 2, at 24-16.
17 See Comment, New SWIFT Rules, supra note 5, at 318 n.52.
18 See infra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
19 For a discussion of choice of law theories and their relevance in the determination of currency
exchange damages, see Comment, Conversion of Judgments Measured in Foreign Currencies, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165 (1982)[hereinafter Comment, Conversion of Judgments]. Courts have
often ignored the parties' chosen forum, however, and have held the governing law to be the law of
the place where the contract was to be performed. See, e.g., Richard v. American Union Bank, 241
N.Y. 163, 149 N.E. 338 (1925). The law of the place where the customer paid for the transfer has
also been selected over the parties' choice. See, e.g., American Union Bank v. Swiss Bank Corp., 40
F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1930).
20 In Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphries, 272 U.S. 517 (1926), the United States
Supreme Court based its damage determination on an obligation arising under West German law,
the appropriate law as provided in the contract.
21 In Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979), the
court found the sending bank bound to a CHIPS transfer upon release of the funds, pursuant to the
court's interpretation of the then prevailing CHIPS rules. See infra note 80.
22 To date, no United States court has granted judgment in foreign currency. This "home cur-
rency judgment rule" has been attributed both to case law, dating back at least to the decision of
Justice Holmes in Deutsche Bank, 272 U.S. 517, and statutory law, dating back to the Currency Act
of 1792, An Act Establishing a Mint, and Regulating the Coins of the United States of 1792, 1 Stat.
246, 250, (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982)). For a discussion of the genesis of the
rule, see Brand, Restructuring the U.S. Approach to Judgment on Foreign Currency Liabilities: Build-
ing on the English Experience, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 139, 157-63 (1985); see also Association of the
Bar of the City of N.Y., Foreign Currency Judgments." 1985 Report of the Committee on Foreign and
Comparative Law, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 791, 795-99 (1986)[hereinafter N.Y. Bar Report];
Effros, The Legal Nature of Obligations Payable in Foreign Currencies, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM.
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uniform rule which specifically delineates both the basis of damage deter-
minations and the applicable exchange rule would thus reduce both con-
fusion and conflict in the courts.
This Comment is divided into four parts. Section II briefly charac-
terizes the nature of the foreign exchange loss problem in EFTs.24 Sec-
tion III broadly reviews the current law respecting exchange losses and
discusses the increased complexity of the exchange loss problem due to
the introduction of message-switching and clearinghouse intermediaries
in EFTs.25 Section IV reviews and evaluates the proposal to extend the
SWIFT interest loss allocation rules to the exchange loss problem, ulti-
mately concluding that the proposal does not sufficiently resolve the ex-
change problem as it relates to EFT intermediaries.26 Finally, Section V
presents two alternatives to deal specifically and exclusively with the allo-
cation of exchange loss liability resulting from delays in EFTs.27
II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
EFT exchange losses commonly arise whenever there is a delay in a
transfer simultaneous to an increase (or decrease) in the value of the cur-
rency being exchanged ("transferor's currency")."8 When this is the
case, any party involved in an EFT has the potential to cause exchange
losses. Losses may result from: 1) the transferor's failure to effectuate the
transfer according to the terms of its contract with the transferee, or at
the applicable time as provided in the contract; 2) the intermediary's fail-
REG. 445 (1986). Four individual states, including New York, presently require judgment to be
granted in United States dollars only.
23 According to current United States case law, if a foreign currency liability arises in the United
States, the breach-date rule applies. Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925). See generally Brand,
supra note 22, at 141; Comment, Conversion of Judgments, supra note 19, at 170; Comment, The
Need to Retreat from Inflexible Conversion Rules--An Equitable Approach to Judgment in Foreign
Currency, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 871, 873 (1982)[hereinafter Comment, Inflexible Conversion
Rules]. The breach-date rule provides for exchange damages as of the date of breach. If a foreign
currency liability arises in a foreign jurisdiction, the judgment-date rule applies, providing exchange
damages as of the date of judgment. Deutsche Bank, 272 U.S. at 519. See generally Brand, supra
note 22, at 141; Conversion ofJudgments, supra note 19, at 170; Inflexible Conversion Rules, supra, at
881-82.
In Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., 1976 A.C. 443 (H.L. 1975), the English House of
Lords adopted the execution-date or payment-date rule, whereby defendant could choose to pay the
plaintiff either in foreign currency or the equivalent amount in domestic currency on the date of
payment. See infra text accompanying note 136. For discussions of the development of English law,
see Brand, supra note 22, at 143-54; Comment, Inflexible Conversion Rules, supra, at 887-90.
24 See infra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 42-69 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 70-115 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 116-49 and accompanying text.
28 Secretary General's Report, supra note 9, at 280.
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ure to transfer the funds in accordance with its own guidelines, as incor-
porated in its contract with the transferor (if the contract with the
intermediary does not provide a fixed time for transfer, any "unneces-
sary" or "unreasonable" delay causing exchange damages to either the
transferor or transferee would normally lead to a breach of duty/negli-
gence claim); or 3) the transferee's failure to accept the transfer at the
time it is notified of the exchange and given the opportunity to accept
payment.
There are three types of fund transfers: cash exchanges, credit trans-
fers, and debit collections.2 9 Exchange losses can arise when any of these
methods is employed, though that potential increases as the number of
intermediaries involved in the transfer rises. Direct cash exchanges oc-
cur when the transferee has an account with the transferor bank and the
transferor simply instructs the bank to transfer funds into the transferee's
account. Credit transfers are only necessary when the transferee does
not have an account in the transferor bank, and the transferor bank in-
structs another bank (the transferee bank) to pay the transferee. The
transferor bank is then obligated to pay the transferee bank the amount
of the transfer.3" The EFT is a debit collection if the transferor is re-
quired to make payment to a special deposit account held by an interme-
diary, such as the CHIPS fund.3 l The amount of the transfer is then
debited from the fund and paid over to the transferee bank at the time
the transferee instructs the intermediary that it accepts payment.32
Settlement of the transferor's obligation depends upon the transferor
bank's relationship to the transferee bank. A transferor bank that has an
account in the transferee bank may simply instruct the transferee bank to
debit its account for the sum due.33 If the transferor bank does not have
such an account, or if the funds in such an account are insufficient to
satisfy the indebtedness, the transferor bank can further instruct payment
through correspondent banks.34 Finally, payment can be made through
29 Id. at 273-75. Most EFTs involve credit transfers. In any transfer the party seeking to trans-
fer funds, whether a client of a bank or the bank itself, is termed the transferor (as generally used in
CHIPS transactions) or sender (as generally used in SWIFT transactions). The bank, whether act-
ing for itself or on behalf of a non-banking client, is termed the transferor bank (in a CHIPS transac-
tion), or transmitting bank or sending bank (in a SWIFT transaction). The party to receive the
transferred funds is termed the transferee or receivor, and its bank is termed the transferee bank or
receiving bank.
30 Id. at 273-74.
31 See supra note 3.
32 Secretary General's Report, supra note 9, at 274-75.
33 Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 625.
34 Correspondent banks are those in which both the transferor and transferee have accounts.
The correspondent bank debits the transferor bank's account and credits the transferee bank's ac-
count. Id.
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a clearinghouse such as CHIPS if both banks are members or have corre-
spondent bank relationships with other banks that are members. In most
instances the transferor bank would simply pay the amount due into the
CHIPS fund, and CHIPS would then send payment to the transferee
bank." Matters may be complicated, however, if the transferor bank
does not have sufficient funds to pay in full into the CHIPS account. The
transferor might first need to engage in and settle other transfers as trans-
feree before it can settle its account with the original transferee bank.36
At present, neither SWIFT nor CHIPS handles direct foreign cur-
rency exchanges.37 SWIFT merely transmits instructions to transfer in
the currency supplied by the transferor bank. CHIPS, on the other hand,
collects and disburses all funds through its special account in United
States dollars.38 It is not the dealing in foreign currencies that may sub-
ject these organizations to currency exchange liabilities, however, but the
control of the fund's disposition. The banks involved in EFTs may nec-
essarily enter the foreign exchange market in order to transfer funds.
Once in that position, their ability to meet their obligations may be al-
tered by the combination of delays in the transfer of funds and fluctuat-
ing exchange rates.
Consider an example involving a CHIPS transfer. If a Swiss bank's
transfer of dollars to a West German bank through CHIPS is delayed,
the West German bank may try to obtain the dollars by other means in
order to meet its own payment obligations. If the dollar has risen during
the delay, the West German bank will incur an exchange loss when it
obtains these replacement funds. However, once the delayed transfer has
been completed, the West German bank may well be able to transfer the
dollars received back into marks at the higher rate. A drop in the value
of the dollar after the West German bank's "cover," however, may revive
the loss since the transferred funds will be worth less than at the time of
cover. At the same time, a combination of the Swiss bank's delay and
the dollar's rise may have caused it to incur a higher obligation in francs
35 Id. at 628.
36 Id. at 628-30.
37 SWIFr is contemplating entering into the foreign exchange market. Such an expansion of
operations is likely to take a great deal of money and time, and is not expected to occur anytime in
the near future. Banking Technology, supra note 1, at 133.
38 As a member of the New York Clearinghouse Association, CHIPS is subject to the laws of the
State of New York. New York law requires judgment to be granted in United States dollars. N.Y.
JUD. LAW. § 27 (Consol. 1975). Interestingly, the New York Clearinghouse Association was a driv-
ing force behind the New York legislature's "deletion of language in section 3-107(2) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which had expressly provided for the payment in foreign currency of instruments
denominated in that currency." N. Y Bar Report, supra note 22, at 798. See also Brand, supra note
22, at 175.
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before exchanging into dollars. Thus, one of the parties will have suf-
fered a loss.3 9 Transfers utilizing SWIFT would operate similarly, with
SWIFT merely sending a message effectuating the transfer rather than
actually handling the money.
At present neither SWIFT nor CHIPS has adopted rules that allo-
cate this exchange loss risk.4 Conceivably, the loss incurred in these
situations, given the relatively short time of delays, may be too small to
warrant the costs of litigation.41 Judicially implemented risk allocation
thus fails to ensure that exchange losses are borne by the party causing
them. This practical limit of the law subjects the entire EFT system to
tremendous potential abuses. Moreover, as discussed below, the diffi-
culty in simply attempting to apply existing judicial rules to the EFT
exchange loss case creates severe problems of its own.
III. STATE OF THE LAW: JUDGMENTS ON FOREIGN
CURRENCY LIABILITIES
Generally, the various jurisdictions apply three rules when deter-
mining exchange losses: the breach-date rule, the judgment-date rule,
and the execution-date rule.42 The effect of these rules depends upon
whether the forum permits judgments entered in foreign currencies or
requires judgment in the home currency only.43 Each of the rules pro-
vides an equitable allocation of liabilities only in certain circumstances. 44
Courts have thus applied different rules in different circumstances, and
no clearly defined or preferred rule has evolved either domestically,
within single jurisdictions, or internationally.45 While detailed explana-
tion of these rules is beyond the scope of this Comment,46 a brief descrip-
39 See, e.g., Henne, Foreign Exchange, in SIBOS '81, supra note 10, at 59.
40 Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 636.
41 Of course, if the exchange losses are tied in with other losses, namely principal and interest
losses, litigation may be justified.
42 See supra note 23. The breach-date rule provides that a plaintiff entitled to a sum certain in a
foreign currency will receive the home currency value of that amount converted at the applicable
exchange rate on the date of breach. The judgment-date rule converts the foreign currency to the
home currency at the exchange rate prevailing on the date of judgment. The execution-date rule,
alternatively termed the satisfaction-date rule or payment-date rule, converts the currency award on
the date of execution.
43 See supra note 22.
44 See Brand, supra note 22, at 177-81; Comment, Inflexible Conversion Rules, supra note 23, at
891-93; Comment, Conversion of Judgments, supra note 19, at 174. See also infra notes 47-55 and
accompanying text.
45 This is evidenced by the dual approach of the United States federal courts, utilizing both the
breach-date rule and judgment-date rule in varying circumstances. See supra note 23.
46 See Brand, supra note 22, at 139; Comment, Inflexible Conversion Rules, supra note 23, at
871.
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tion of each is necessary.
A. The Typical Exchange Case: Application of the Breach-Date,
Judgment-Date, and Execution-Date Rules
Foreign exchange problems most often arise in the sale of commodi-
ties denominated in foreign currencies.' When a buyer breaches an obli-
gation to pay in a foreign currency, the seller often seeks recovery in its
home currency. If the home currency has appreciated or depreciated in
value since the date of contract, then either seller or buyer may receive a
windfall depending on the rule employed by the forum.
If the home currency rule is employed in the seller's forum and this
currency has appreciated in value, application of the breach-date rule
would yield the best return for the seller-payment in the foreign cur-
rency to be converted into the home currency at the exchange rate on the
date of breach.48 Since the home currency has appreciated by the date of
judgment or execution, application of either the judgment-date or execu-
tion-date rule would result in the seller's receiving a lesser amount of the
home currency, determined by converting the foreign currency to the
home currency at a time when the exchange rate is higher. Application
of the breach-date rule, while providing the seller with the greatest re-
turn, does not necessarily create the most equitable result, however. If
the seller here intended to use the foreign currency as a commodity (in
order to be exchanged for home currency), then the breach-date rule
does provide equity because the seller is awarded the same amount of the
home currency it would have received had the foreign currency payment
been received on time and then converted to home currency. If, how-
ever, the seller intended to use the foreign currency as cash (in order, for
example, to purchase goods in the foreign state), then the value of the
foreign currency should bear no relation to the value of the home cur-
rency. In this circumstance, seller is treated equitably whenever the loss
experienced in terms of the foreign currency is fully compensated. As a
result, the execution-date rule provides equity by awarding the seller the
same purchasing power on the date of execution as it would have re-
ceived had payment been timely.49
If the home currency has depreciated in value, application of the
47 See generally Comment, Inflexible Conversion Rules, supra note 23, at 873-74.
48 The assumption made here is that the home currency continues to appreciate over time.
Hence the rate of exchange (the amount of the foreign currency needed to purchase one unit of the
home currency) will be lower on the date of breach than it would on either the judgment date or
execution date. Id. at 875-76.
49 See generally id. at 874-75.
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execution-date rule would yield the best return for the seller, ° though
again not necessarily the most equitable return.5 1 In either case, applica-
tion of the judgment-date rule would rarely result in the best return for
either party,5 2 and never result in the most equitable return.53 The ineq-
uities of any one rule's universal application has led to two results. First,
the courts apply different rules depending on the circumstances of the
case. 5 Second, different courts apply more than one rule in similar cir-
cumstances.55 Extending these rules to EFTs creates even more
problems.
B. A Typical Exchange Case Involving an Electronic Funds Transfer
A typical EFT utilizing the CHIPS system involves a transferor and
transferee from two different countries, and, because the CHIPS system
requires it,56 the use of United States dollars.5 7  Suppose Swiss Bank
wishes to send German Bank DM 4,000,000 through CHIPS in settle-
ment of an obligation. The transfer is to take place on a Friday after-
noon. Suppose further that at the time of the transfer the dollar has a
value equal to DM 4. Swiss Bank deposits $1,000,000 into the CHIPS
fund, but CHIPS delays paying German Bank and does not complete the
transfer by the close of business Friday. The following Monday, the
transfer is finally completed, but during the delay58 the dollar has fallen
50 The assumption here is that the home currency continues to depreciate. Hence the rate of
exchange will be lower on the execution date than it would on the earlier judgment date or breach
date.
51 If seller intended to use the foreign currency as a commodity to trade for home currency, it
would be more equitable to convert the currencies at the rate of exchange prevailing on the breach
date.
52 The judgment-date rule can provide the best return to the buyer if the home currency appreci-
ates up to judgment date and then depreciates thereafter. It can provide the best return to the seller
if the home currency depreciates up to judgment date and then appreciates thereafter.
53 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
54 See supra note 23.
55 Federal courts apply the judgment-date rule in some circumstances and the breach-date rule
in others. See supra note 23. In contrast, the New York courts, since Kantor v. Aristo Hosiery Co.,
222 A.D. 502, 226 N.Y.S. 582 (1928), have applied the breach-date rule in all circumstances. See
Comment, Inflexible Conversion Rules, supra note 23, at 878.
56 See supra note 38.
57 A typical EFT utilizing the SWIFT system may involve a foreign transferor, a foreign trans-
feree from a country other than the transferor's, the use of any currency desired by the parties, and
the existence of other intermediaries such as correspondent banks, or even CHIPS, depending on
the way in which the parties wish to transfer the money once the messages are sent. Transfers
utilizing SWIFT may be exceedingly more complex than those utilizing CHIPS alone. For the sake
of simplicity, the only typical exchange case involving an EFT that is presented here is one involving
a CHIPS transfer. Nonetheless, the same questions and problems that arise in transfers utilizing
CHIPS also arise in transfers utilizing SWIFT.
58 The length of the delay, of course, depends on when payment should have been made. From
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to DM 3. When German Bank finally receives payment, the $1,000,000
is worth only DM 3,000,000, and German Bank sues CHIPS and Swiss
Bank for DM 1,000,000. Putting aside the problem of allocating liability
between the two defendants, application of the traditional exchange rules
causes obvious problems.
The first problem involves the determination of the breach date.
Most EFTs do not contractually stipulate time of payment.59 Since the
breach derives from negligence rather than from contract, a fixed time at
which either defendant breached its duty cannot be found. Though it
may be determined when payment was actually made ("time of perform-
ance"), this will not always help determine whether there was a breach.
Thus the debate over "time of payment" in the EFT adds a new dimen-
sion to the currency exchange problem that is not present in the typical
exchange case-namely, the need to determine when payment "should"
have been made.'
If time of payment is deemed to be the time at which the transferor
commences the transfer procedure,61 then any exchange rate fluctuation
between this time of payment and the time of performance gives rise to
the time CHIPS collects the money from the transferor until the time it pays the transferee (the float
period, see supra note 14), there is a delay. In a sense, then, every EFT involves a delay. Most
delays, however, will be so short and the losses attributable to them so small, that the injured party
will not bother litigating unless the exchange losses are tied in with other losses (such as interest
losses) or unless one of the parties simply wants out of the transfer. The amount of the loss will
depend on: 1) the amount of the principal sum transferred; 2) the period of the delay; and 3) the
amount of exchange rate fluctuation occuring over that period.
59 There may be an underlying contract with a specified time of payment, the obligations of
which the EFT is intended to satisfy. This specified date does not affect the determination of the
breach date. While the breach of duty by the intermediary in the EFT-the delay in the transfer of
funds-may have caused a breach of the underlying contract, the breach of the intermediary does
not hinge on the time of payment in the underlying contract. For example, if Swiss Bank sought to
pay an obligation early in order to take advantage of a beneficial exchange rate and payment was
delayed by the intermediary until the due date, losses may have been incurred by Swiss Bank even
though payment was timely according to the underlying contract.
60 There are various times at which payment may be determined to be final. The earliest point is
the time at which transferee sends notice to the transferee bank, as in the Federal Reserve's
FEDWIRE system which handles EFs between banks with Federal Reserve accounts. Secretary
General's Report, supra note 9, at 276. Other times include: 1) the time at which the sending bank
releases the transfer message, Delbrueck, 609 F.2d 1047; 2) the time at which the receiving bank
receives the transfer message, Buffalo Insulation Distrib. v. Marine Midland Bank, (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Apr. 11, 1972), cited in Banking Decisions: Wire Transfer Complete Before Bookkeeping Entry, 89
BANKING L.J. 851 (1972); 3) the time at which the receiving bank credits the transferee's account,
Tenax S.S. Co. v. The Brimnes, 1973[1] All E.R. 769 (Q.B. 1973); and 4) the time at which the
transferee is notified of the credit, Guaranty Trust Co. v. Lyon, 67 Misc. 334, 124 N.Y.S.2d 680
(Sup. Ct. 1953). See generally Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 651; Secretary General's
Report, supra note 9, at 276-77.
61 The transfer procedure generally commences upon the transferor's notification and instruc-
tion to the transferor bank of the anticipated transfer.
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the breach-date measure of damages.62 In the above example, time of
payment would be the time at which Swiss Bank deposited the
$1,000,000 into CHIPS, when the exchange rate was DM 4 to the dollar,
while at the time of actual performance the exchange rate was only DM 3
to the dollar. Thus, German Bank would recover the equivalent of DM
1,000,000. This sum would be awarded in United States dollars accord-
ing to New York law, and the rate of exchange would be computed as of
the breach date. Thus German Bank would actually receive
$333,333.33.63 Applying the judgment-date and execution-date rules,
damages would be measured by calculating the fluctuation between the
date the transfer was effectuated and either the judgment date or the exe-
cution date.64
If time of payment is deemed to be when transferee actually receives
payment, however, none of the three rules will yield exchange rate fluctu-
ation damages.65 There will be no liability for delay. In the above exam-
ple, German Bank would therefore be forced to accept the equivalent of
DM 3,000,000 actually received in the transfer.
Finally, there are several moments between the time the transfer is
effectuated and when the transferee receives payment that might be
deemed time of payment by a court.6 6 These include: 1) the time CHIPS
receives payment from the transferor; 2) the time CHIPS notifies trans-
feree of receipt from transferor; 3) the time transferor's payment to
CHIPS becomes irrevocable; and 4) the time transferee agrees to accept
payment from transferor.67
62 Though it appears contradictory, in this case the time of performance is the breach date, and
both are distinct from "time of payment." This is in contrast to the typical exchange case, where
time of payment is the contractually stipulated time at which payment was to be made, and failure to
make payment at this time is a breach. Here the breach occurs only as a consequence of the change
in exchange rate. Thus the breach arises only when the transfer goes through at an exchange rate
different from that when it was sent, and the "breach date" is hence different from the time of
payment.
63 The breach-date rule yields an exchange rate of DM 3 to the dollar, so a DM 1,000,000
recovery would yield $333,333.33.
64 If the dollar continues to fall and is only worth DM 2 on the date ofjudgment, the judgment-
date rule would yield a recovery of $500,000. In this case, the transferee would have felt the same
DM 1,000,000 loss on the date of breach, but by the judgment date this amount could be compen-
sated only through payment of $500,000 due to the exchange rate at that time.
If the dollar has further fallen by the date of execution to only DM 1, the execution-date rule
would compensate German Bank in the amount of $1 million, due to the 1:1 exchange rate at that
time.
65 In this case, the time of payment would equal the above-determined breach date. See supra
note 62. Thus there is no delay, and no liability for delay.
66 See supra note 60 for a listing of times that various courts have already deemed "time of
payment."
67 Because a SWIFT transfer involves the exchange of numerous messages along with the ex-
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The time of payment problem extends itself beyond the determina-
tion of damages to the question of which party to the transfer is liable.
Once it is determined when payment should have been made, it is neces-
sary to determine which party to the transfer was at fault in preventing
the transfer from being completed at that time. As a result, the time of
payment determination directs the court's attention to each party's duties
throughout the course of the transfer. Another complicating element,
then, is the role and potential liabilities of the intermediaries. In the ex-
ample above, assuming German Bank is entitled to an additional DM
1,000,000 equivalent in dollars, who is liable-Swiss Bank or CHIPS?
Should liability follow fault or is there an assumption of risk by Swiss
Bank in utilizing the intermediary? Did German Bank itself assume the
risk of loss by agreeing to accept payment via CHIPS? If CHIPS dis-
claims liability in its contract with Swiss Bank, is Swiss Bank necessarily
liable? Was CHIPS really at fault in delaying payment to German Bank,
or did it have valid security reasons for doing so?
The answers to these questions may depend on both the facts of the
case and the chosen forum. All of the questions essentially collapse into
one: in what circumstances and to what extent should the intermediary
be held liable?68 The speed of the EFT, the lack of written agreement
between the transferor and the transferor bank regarding any particular
transfer, the nature of EFTs as credit and debit transfers rather than cash
transfers, and the increasing use of EFTs, all make immediate uniform
resolution of the problem imperative. Moreover, as SWIFT and CHIPS
themselves contemplate entering the foreign exchange market, 69 resolv-
ing the problem now would clarify their respective situations in the
future.
IV. EXTENDING SWIFT RULES ON ALLOCATION OF INTEREST
LOSSES TO ALLOCATION OF EXCHANGE LossES
At present, no statute governs international EFTs. As a result, only
change of funds, there are many other instances in a SWIFT transfer that could be deemed "time of
payment."
68 The question is not exclusive to the EFr situation. Wire transfers and even in-hand deliveries
of payments present the same question. At present, there is no available case law on the subject of
exchange losses in EFTs. There is, of course, case law available on the subject of exchange losses in
paper-based or mail transfers, but these cases do not address the relevant issue of finality of payment
that is unique to the EFT. As a result, these cases will not be analogized. See generally Secretary
General's Report, supra note 9, at 273.
69 Entrance into the foreign exchange market would involve the networks in currency swaps.
Presently, of course, the networks' only involvement in foreign exchange dealings consist of facilitat-
ing transfers in which one or both of the parties intends, unknown to the intermediary, to effectuate
an exchange of currencies either before or after the transfer.
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private contracts and the courts allocate risks of principal, interest, and
exchange losses associated with them.7" SWIFT has promulgated its
own rules and operating procedures to govern parties transferring
through its network. These rules both delineate the responsibilities of the
parties and fix liabilities for interest losses resulting from delayed trans-
fers.7 1 Although these rules and procedures could be extended to govern
exchange losses,72 such an extension alone would be inadequate.73
In contrast to the SWIFT rules, CHIPS disclaims liability for delay
in any event, even if system error causes the losses.74  Additionally,
CHIPS retains liability for network-incurred fraud only up to the limits
of a $25,000,000 insurance policy.75 CHIPS also provides procedures for
adjusting erroneous payments between banks through incorporation of
the Council on International Banking ("CIB") Rules. 76 The CIB Rules
"govern compensation for the lost availability [of funds] and do not ap-
ply to recovery of lost principal. ' 77 While the rules clearly contemplate
interest losses, it is not clear whether they also apply to exchange losses.
Moreover, even if the rules do apply to exchange losses, or can be ex-
tended to cover them, they would be inadequate insofar as CHIPS itself
always disclaims liability.78
Only one court has thus far considered the enforceability of network
rules and operating procedures. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in Delbruek & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co.,7 9 upheld the irrevocability of a CHIPS transfer, thereby giving legal
effect to the CHIPS rules defining finality of transfer.8" Presently,
70 N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 2, at 24-6. See generally Annotation, Duty and Liability
of Bank Under Agreement to Remit Money or Establish Credit, 45 A.L.R. 1052 (1926); Annotation,
Duty and Liability of Bank Under Credit Agreement to Remit Money, 27 A.L.R. 1488 (1923). For
case collections, see 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks § 311-19 (1963); 7 C. ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING
ch. 172, §§ 4751-62 (perm. ed. 1936 & Supp. 1954); 6 A. MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING ch. 12,
§§ 3-12 (rev. enlarged 1975 ed. & Supp. 1979); 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 172 (1938); Tallackson
& Vallejo, supra note 4, at 639-66.
71 SWIFT USER HANDBOOK, supra note 8. See infra note 81.
72 See supra note 10.
73 See infra notes 81-115 and accompanying text.
74 NEw YORK CLEARINGHOUSE ASSOCIATION, RULES GOVERNING THE CLEARINGHOUSE IN-
TERBANK PAYMENTS SYSTEM, rule 15 (1981).
75 Id. rule 16(b).
76 Administrative Procedure No. 2, Errors Other than System Caused, in NEw YORK CLEARING-
HOUSE ASSOCIATION, CHIPS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, adopted Oct. 29, 1970. See COUN-
CIL ON INTERNATIONAL BANKING, INTERBANK COMPENSATION RULES (1980)[hereinafter CIB
RULES]. Article III, 3 limits application of the rules to errors not caused by CHIPS.
77 CIB RULES, supra note 76, art. I.
78 Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 640, 641.
79 609 F.2d 1047.
80 Delbrueck, a German banking house, entered into three foreign exchange contracts with Her-
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neither SWIFT nor CHIPS have rules allocating risk of exchange loss, so
there are no exchange rules for the courts to hold enforceable. On the
basis of the Delbruek decision, however, it appears that if such rules are
promulgated the courts would hold them enforceable.
The SWIFT rules presently allocate liability for interest losses due
to late payment by delineating the responsibilities of each party to a
SWIFT transfer."1 In addition, SWIFT rules provide a procedure for
statt Bank, a West German bank. Delbrueck, 609 F.2d at 1049. Two of these exchanges were due
on June 26, 1974 (one for $2,500,000 and the other for $10,000,000). The third exchange, for
$10,000,000, was due on June 27, 1974. Id. at 1049-50. According to the Circuit Court, the follow-
ing events transpired:
In accordance with the authorization procedures, Delbrueck sent a telex message to Manufac-
turers [Hanover Trust Company, a New York bank with which it had an account] on June 25,
1974 ordering Manufacturers to transfer, on June 26, a total of $12.5 million to Chase [Manhat-
ten Bank, a New York bank with which Herstatt bank had an account] for the account of
Herstatt. In addition, early on the morning of June 26, Delbrueck authorized the payment of
$10 million due on June 27.
Then the problems began. Herstatt was closed by the German banking authorities around
10:30 a.m. [EST] on June 26. Chase heard of the closing and immediately froze payments out
of Herstatt's account but continued to accept incoming transfers. Delbrueck sent a telex
message to Manufacturers at 11:30 a.m. requesting that the $10 million transfer to be made on
June 27 be stopped. On June 26 Manufacturers transferred to Chase via the CHIPS system the
payment which had been ordered to be made that day, namely, $10 million transferred at 11:36
a.m. and $2.5 million at 11:37 am. Debrueck called Manufacturers at around 12:00 noon and
later sent a telex message, trying to stop or recall the $12.5 million in payments which had
already been made .... At around 9:00 p.m. the evening of June 26, Chase formally credited
Herstatt's account with the $12.5 million.
Id. The issue in the case was "whether the transfer of funds via CHIPS at 11:36 and 11:37 were
final." Id. at 1050. The court concluded that the transfers were final and irrevocable when sent:
Although the Clearing House previously had no specific rule concerning the finality of CHIPS
transfers, all member banks must have believed that once transfers were released, they were
final, except for adjustments made for clerical errors. Delbrueck's conduct supports this fact,
because it initially requested stop payment only on the $10 million to be paid on June 27,
apparently believing that the June 26 transfers had been made and were irrevocable.
Id. The court further supported this holding by noting changes in the CHIPS rules after the Her-
statt failure to allow revocation of transfers, by analogy to U.C.C. §§ 3-410 and 4-303, and by re-
course to the common law treatment of choses in action. Id at 1051.
81 Responsibilities are allocated as follows:
(1) The sending bank is responsible if:
(a) SWIFT did not acknowledge the message,
(b) it received an acknowledgment, but the message appeared on the report of unde-
livered messages,
(c) it entered an urgent message, but received no delivery notification from SWIFT,
(d) it entered a message in an inappropriate format,
(e) it failed to react promptly to a SWIFT notification that a bank, regional proces-
sor, or operating center is not functioning;
(2) The receiving bank is responsible if:
(a) it failed to carry out the payment date instructions in the message,
(b) it failed to react promptly to system messages,
(c) it failed to reconcile adequately incoming messages according to sequence num-
bers, or
(d) it failed to adhere to SWIFT's terminal correction policy;
(3) SWIFT is responsible if:
(a) it acknowledged a message to the sender, but failed to put the message on the
undelivered message report and failed to deliver the message,
(b) it or its personnnel failed to perform,
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making claims against SWIFT.82 If a delayed payment results in an in-
terest loss, and if both the sending bank and receiving bank disclaim any
fault, then the two banks must jointly present a claim to SWIFT on be-
half of the sending bank.83 Each interest loss by itself must exceed
100,000 Belgian Francs ("BF")84 before SWIFT will hear the claim.85
Interest losses from separate events cannot be accumulated to meet the
BF 100,000 requirement.86 Once these conditions are met, SWIFT must
then either substantiate the claim by determining that it failed to meet its
responsibilities, as outlined above, or reject it.87 If SWIFT accepts the
claim it will reimburse the transmitting bank with year-end credits.88 If
SWIFT rejects the claim it will charge the transmitting bank BF
30,000.89 Whenever a claim is rejected or disputed the transmitting bank
may seek arbitration by serving written notice upon SWIFT within three
months of the rejection.9" If total claims accepted in any one year exceed
SWIFT's BF 20,000,000 "interest loss contingency item" in its annual
budget, awards are shared pro rata.91
The SWIFT rules, as promulgated, establish a number of procedures
useful in determining exchange damages. 92 First, by providing an inter-
nal mechanism for adjudicating claims against SWIFT, the rules mini-
mize choice-of-law problems and forum shopping.93 Second, the rules
(c) it failed to notify members promptly of failures of banks, operating centers, and
regional processors.
SWIFT USER HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 7.
82 Id. § 7(b).
83 Id.
84 SWIF is a not-for-profit cooperative company organized under Belgian law. SWIFTs Arti-
cles of Association provide that "[a]ll matters which are not provided for in these Articles of Associ-
ation shall be governed by the 'Gecoordineerde Wetten op de Handelsvennootshappen'
(Consolidated Acts on Commercial Corporations)." SWIFT, Articles of Association of Society for
Worldwide Interbank Telecommunications, art. 43 (1979)(incorporated in SWIFT USER HAND-
BOOK, supra note 8, § 7(b)). The SWIFT USER HANDBOOK provides that "[a]ll relations including
the rights and obligations between SWIFT and the users shall be governed by the laws of Belgium."
Id. § 7, ch. 7, 1 3.
85 Id. at § 7(b), § 7 comments at 4.




90 Id. at § 7, ch. 7, 4. All disputes going to arbitration "shall be finally settled by the court of
arbitration sitting in Brussels, Belgium." Id. at § 7, ch. 7, 1 1. Once made, "the decision of the
Court of Arbitration is not liable to appeal or any other recourse before arbitrators except for correc-
tion of material errors appealed for within thirty days following notification of the Court's decision."
Id. at § 7, ch. 7, 3.
91 Id. at § 7. Each member bank pays a proportionate share into the BF 20,000,000 "interest
loss contingency item."
92 See generally Comment, New SWIFT Rules, supra note 5, at 323-25.
93 Id. at 323.
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help to determine liability by delineating the responsibilities of each
transfer participant.94 Third, in establishing an "interest loss contin-
gency item" into which all member banks must pay, the rules distribute
the losses caused by SWIFT among all members.95 Finally, the rules
alleviate the problem of determining time of payment in international
EFTs96 by defining such terms as "time of receipt,"97 "value date,"
98
"pay date," 99 and "cutoff time."''
Yet the SWIFT rules have their weaknesses. For example, allowing
SWIFT to adjudicate claims against itself, and thereby determine its own
liability, creates an obvious conflict of interest.101 While SWIFT may
have little incentive to reject any valid claim,'0 2 it nonetheless does have
incentive to minimize claims: the lower the claims in any one year, the
less likely it is that member banks will have to restock a depleted contin-
gency fund for the following year.'0 3 Insofar as SWIFT is composed
solely of member banks, it is in the obvious interest of the members as a
group, and hence the organization as a whole, to minimize the claims
paid out. Moreover, the rules fail to provide completely both a forum for
claims against member banks, and procedures for enforcing liability rul-
ings against members." 0
Additionally, the SWIFT rules are replete with ambiguous phrases.
In defining the standards of care for each participant, the rules do not
define a "fail[ure] to react promptly,"' 1 5 a "fail[ure] to reconcile ade-
quately,"'0 6 or a "fail[ure] to perform."'0 7 While the rules do provide
94 Id. at 324.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 324, 325.
97 "The time of receipt of a message at the [receiving bank] shall be the output time." SWIFT
USER HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 7.
98 "The value date defines the date when the amount of the transfer is at the disposal of the
receiving bank." Id
99 The pay date "defines the date on which the receiving [bank] or a third bank is requested to
credit or pay the beneficiary customer (private person or any other non-banking institution)." Id
100 "Cutoff time is the latest time of day... for receiving banks to apply same day value to effect
funds transfers in domestic currency in favor of third banks." Id
101 Comment, New S WIFT Rules, supra note 5, at 323.
102 Id
103 There are, of course, arbitration proceedings available for those banks whose claims are not
accepted by SWIFT, see supra note 90, but insofar as arbitration decisions are final and non-appeala-
ble, this option does not afford injured parties sufficient protection. Id.
104 See New SWIFT Rules, supra note 5, at 323.
105 See supra note 81, (1)(e), (2)(b), (3)(c)(quoting SWIFT USER HANDBOOK, supra note 8,
§ 7).
106 Id., (2)(c)(quoting SWIFT USER HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 7).
107 Id., (3)(b)(quoting SWIFT USER HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 7).
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objective measures for determining fault, °8 they also introduce uncer-
tainties and potential disparities in the adjudication of claims among dif-
ferent forums.
Furthermore, establishing the contingency fund unnecessarily limits
the liability of SWIFT, and hence its member banks, when SWIFT is at
fault. Although limiting claims to losses exceeding BF 100,000 and
charging unsuccessful claimants a BF 30,000 penalty may "eliminate
small claims and minimize frivolous claims,"'0 9 it also discriminates
against would-be successful claimants by deterring them from pursuing
their claims and burdening them with a loss of up to BF 100,000 (the
minimum claim requirement), even though they may have been com-
pletely free of fault.
Finally, SWIFT definitions clarifying time of payment only settle
the sending bank's liabilities upon the release of the transfer message.110
The receiving bank's liabilities are unclear because it is not specified
when the receiving bank becomes bound to accept a payment order."'
Ideally, the receiving bank should not be bound upon receipt, but should
be granted a limited right to refuse payment so that it may retain control
of the credit it wishes to extend." 2 The time period must not be exces-
sive, however, because interest and exchange problems would then arise
anew. 113
Each of the above problems can conceivably be corrected within the
framework of the present SWIFT rules.' The principal problem with
extending these rules to exchange losses, however, is that they wholly fail
to determine the extent of losses. The rules stipulate when and in what
circumstances each of the parties to a transfer is responsible, but do not
stipulate the extent of each party's potential liabilities. The old problem
of which rule applies (the breach-date rule, the judgment-date rule, or the
execution-date rule) remains for resolution at the discretion of the adju-
dicating body." 5
108 New SWIFT Rules, supra note 5, at 324.
109 Id.
110 Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 651-52.
Ill Id.
112 Id. at 652. See also Secretary General's Report, supra note 9, at 278.
113 Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 65. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
114 See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
115 As noted, such an approach leads to cross-forum discrepancies and general confusion. See
supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text. As a result, extension of the SWIFr rules as they now
exist is thoroughly unsatisfactory.
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V. MODIFICATION OF SWIFT RULES
There are two ways in which the SWIFT rules could be modified to
govern the risk of exchange losses successfully.116 The first modification
is operational, and entails drawing a detailed "model" contract to govern
all EFT transactions. The second modification is procedural, requiring
the establishment of an independent tribunal to adjudicate all exchange
loss claims arising from a SWIFT transfer. Either modification necessi-
tates both general changes in the existing SWIFT rules (for the purpose
of remedying the problems noted above), 7 and specification of the ap-
plicable exchange rule in appropriate circumstances." '
A. The Model Contract
The first option provides for a model contract to be utilized in all
EFTs. All parties to an EFT would be required to agree to the model
contract's terms, stipulating the circumstances under which each ex-
change rule would be applied to achieve the most equitable result. Once
such an approach were instituted by SWIFT, it could easily be adopted
by other networks. Moreover, insofar as such standardized rules would
provide certainty and fairness, those networks that fail to adopt the rules
would find themselves at a competitive disadvantage with those which
do. Provided such a contract is judicially validated in all forums adjudi-
cating EFT exchange problems, the arrangement would provide enforce-
able uniformity on an international scale without necessitating
116 There is also a legislative alternative to modifying the SWIFT rules, involving an international
multilateral agreement or uniform national legislation. This alternative, while attractive, does not
appear at present to be viable. See generally Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 655-56;
infra notes 147-49 and-accompanying text (discussion of the independent tribunal).
117 Modifications of the existing rules would improve the handling of interest losses equally as
well. General modifications may include:
1) Providing procedures for enforcing liability judgments. One such procedure might provide
that all future payments sent to any bank that has an outstanding liability judgment against it by
other member banks through the SWIFT system, be withheld until the liability is met.
2) Replacing the contingency fund with a contingency insurance fund, the proceeds of which
are to be used to purchase insurance. When damages in any one year exceed the insurance coverage,
member banks are to pay in the remainder proportionately so that all losses are fully compensated.
3) Removing the limitations on and requirements for bringing a claim. If claims of under BF
100,000 are expected to burden SWIFT unduly, arbitration procedures can be arranged with a right
of appeal to SWIFT.
4) Defining time of payment for the receiving bank as the time the receiving bank is notified of
the exchange and has the opportunity to accept payment (insofar as sending bank's liability is con-
cerned), and the time the receiving bank has accepted payment (insofar as receiving bank's liability is
concerned). Such an arrangement prevents receiving bank from claiming exchange losses incurred
between the time it had the opportunity to accept and the actual time of acceptance, while enabling
it to retain control of the credit it wishes to extend.
118 See infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
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international legislation, uniform national legislation, or the formation of
an independent tribunal. The remaining question, then, is whether all
jurisdictions will enforce such a contract. The answer, of course, de-
pends on the content of the provisions.
1. The Model Contract-Content
The common EFT occurs so swiftly that written authorization is
impossible. As a result, it is impractical to require written authorization
by a specifically negotiated contract for each individual EFT. This may
be one reason why CHIPS and SWIFT require membership for the use of
their systems, since membership includes agreement to abide by the rules
of the network. Once the bank agrees to the provisions and is inducted
into the organizations as a member, it is subject to the terms of the mem-
bership contract in all future uses of the system. This membership con-
tract is the subject of the model contract provisions presented here.
The contractual rules allocating risk of exchange loss must include
two substantive sections: 1) the responsibilities of each party to the EFT
must be delineated in order to determine which party is liable; and
2) rules must be established for determining the extent of each party's
liability. In other words, liability must first be identified and then
calculated.
The SWIFT rules on interest loss allocation provide a satisfactory
framework for determining who is liable. The responsibilities of parties
in a clearinghouse system (such as CHIPS), however, differ from those of
parties in a message switching network (such as SWIFT). As a result,
this section of a contract designed for the use of both types of network
must be exceedingly general, stipulating only that each party is liable for
exchange losses it causes. In this circumstance, the court would have to
be the ultimate arbiter of which party is at fault in a transfer. To ease
this decision, the contract should permit the individual networks to sup-
plement this section of the contract with a list of each party's specific
responsibilities,' 19 but the contract should strictly prohibit the network
from escaping liability when it is at fault for a delay.
As an alternative to the single model contract to be utilized by both
types of network, different model contracts may be drawn for each. In
this case, the responsibilities of all parties to a transfer would be deline-
ated much like the SWIFT rules do now,12 ° though they would have to
be somewhat more specific. Once again, the network should be prohib-
119 Such supplementary rules could be similar to the present SWIFT Rules. See supra note 81.
120 Id.
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ited from escaping liability when its own actions cause the exchange
losses.
In determining whether there is exchange liability, the court must
first determine whether the transferee intended to exchange the trans-
ferred currency into another currency upon receipt. If so, it should be
apparent that the failure of the transferee to receive the transferred funds
in a timely manner resulted in an inability to exchange the funds at a
favored exchange rate, thereby causing exchange loss.121 The court must
thus determine if there was a delay, and if so which party was at fault.
The contract should provide guidelines for this determination by specify-
ing exactly when each party's responsibilities end; the so-called "time of
payment."
Ideally, the contract should provide that: 1) the sender should be
liable for any exchange losses occurring between the initiation of any er-
roneous transfers or messages and the initiation of the ultimately ac-
knowledged transfer or message; 2) the network should be liable for any
exchange losses occurring between the sender's initiation of the ulti-
mately acknowledged transfer or message and the time when the receiv-
ing bank is notified of the exchange and has the opportunity to accept
payment;' 22 and 3) the receiving bank should itself be liable for any ex-
change losses incurred between the time at which it was notified of the
exchange and had the opportunity to accept payment, and the time at
which it actually accepted payment. 23
The second part of the model contract, establishing the extent of
liability, should provide guidelines for the application of the exchange
rules.' 24 Which are the most equitable rules depends on the currency in
which the award must be made in any particular jurisdiction. 125 Thus,
different guidelines must be drawn for jurisdictions with the home cur-
rency rule and jurisdictions that allow foreign currency judgments.' 26
121 If the court determines that the transferee did not intend to exchange the currency upon
receipt, there should be no exchange losses. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
122 Such a rule makes the network liable for every exchange loss occurring between the time it
receives a valid payment or message and the time it sends or transmits the payment or message. This
may seem excessive, but due to the volume of transfers each day the network's exchange losses
should balance with its exchange gains over the long haul. If not, an objective standard of "unrea-
sonable" delay can be inserted in the contract.
123 See supra note 117.
124 This is the section that the present SWIFT rules are lacking altogether.
125 Some jurisdictions, such as the United States federal courts and various states including New
York, demand that exchange loss damages be awarded in the home currency, in this case United
States dollars. See supra note 22. Other jurisdictions, such as the English courts, permit entry of
judgment in foreign currencies. Miliangos, 1976 A.C. 443.
126 The necessity for such guidelines flows from the unwillingness of some courts, particularly the
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Application of the exchange rules involves a three-step process.
First, it must once again be determined whether the receiving bank in-
tended to convert the money from one currency to another upon re-
ceipt. 127 There can only be an EFT exchange loss if the receiving bank
had such an intention.12 Since exchange losses often result from delayed
payments rather than breached payments, what the receiving bank does
with the money already received provides evidence as to what it intended
to do with the whole.'2 9 If the receiving bank kept the money in the
form of the currency received, it may be assumed that it intended to use
the currency as cash rather than as a commodity, and thus the bank
suffered no exchange loss by the delay.1 0 If, however, the receiving bank
converted the money into a different currency upon receipt, it is reason-
ably likely that it would have done the same had it received payment on
time. If the transferred currency depreciated against the converted cur-
rency during the delay, the receiving bank will have suffered an exchange
loss.
Second, the amount of the exchange loss must be determined. In an
United States federal courts, to abide by contractual stipulations specifying the currency in which
judgments are to be paid. See supra note 22.
127 See supra notes 48-49, 121 and accompanying text. While it would be beneficial if the receiv-
ing bank could state its intent in the contract, this is not possible simply because the parties to a
transfer do not enter into a separate contract for each transaction. See supra Sec. IV.A.l. (Model
Contract-Content).
In some cases the currency exchange may precede the transfer, as when transferor first ex-
changes currency in order to pay in United States dollars through CHIPS. In these cases the trans-
feror bank may be the one to suffer from the exchange loss, as when CHIPS delays payment and the
receiving bank refuses to accept, forcing payment back to transferee bank in what may be depreci-
ated dollars. This situation is essentially equivalent to the one in which transferee intends to ex-
change currencies upon receipt. In both situations the party suffers an exchange loss due to a delay
in the transfer.
128 See supra notes 44, 49, 121 and accompanying text.
129 When there is a delay in a transfer, the transferee has the option of accepting or rejecting late
payment. If it accepts late payment, the transferee is essentially receiving a portion of the total
amount due-the total amount less the exchange and interest losses suffered as a result of the delay.
Thus, the transferee's intent is evidenced by its actions upon late receipt of this portion of the funds
due.
If the transferee rejects late payment, application of the basic mitigation rule dictates that the
extent of exchange losses will be no different than if the transferee had accepted late payment. See
U.C.C. § 2-712 (1978). The failure of the transferee to receive any portion of the amount due,
however, renders difficult the determination of its intent upon timely receipt. The court must then
look to other factors, perhaps the transferee's other dealings and contractual obligations with other
parties around the time of expected receipt, to determine its intent.
Obviously, the delay itself may have caused the receiving bank to change its plans. Normally,
however, it could be expected that a bank would change its plans only if it foresaw a benefit in doing
so. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that the bank would have changed its plans with respect
to the greater amount received as to the lesser amount. In essence, the intent before receipt is not as
relevant as the intent after receipt.
130 See supra notes 48-49, 121 and accompanying text.
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EFT the amount of the currency transferred does not change during a
delay; the value of that currency may change, however. Consider the
earlier example,131 and suppose German Bank had all along intended to
exchange dollars into deutschemarks upon receipt. German Bank
thereby claims a DM 1,000,000 default as the amount of exchange loss it
experienced due to the delay. The amount of recovery should therefore
be denominated in terms of the currency in which the loss was "felt,"
and in which the money was intended to be used, even if the ultimate
award is not made in that currency.132 Obviously, if the receiving bank
intended to use dollars and $1,000,000 were sent, German Bank would
have received $1,000,000 and would thereby have suffered no exchange
loss due to delay. It is precisely because German Bank intended to have
the use of DM 4,000,000, and only received the equivalent of DM
3,000,000, that it has suffered a loss. As a result, the only way to com-
pensate German Bank equitably for its loss is to award it the value of
DM 1,000,000. This can be done in two ways: 1) German Bank can be
awarded DM 1,000,000; or 2) German Bank can be awarded an alternate
currency equivalent of DM 1,000,000 utilizing the execution-date rule,
thereby enabling German Bank to convert the alternate currency to DM
1,000,000 immediately upon receipt.
The final step in the application of the exchange rules is to ensure
equity. In an exchange loss case, only the party experiencing loss has
been treated inequitably, and that party must be compensated to the ex-
tent that it "felt" the loss. The injured party feels the loss in the currency
in which the money was to be used. In the above example, by the time
German Bank received the money its DM 1,000,000 loss was the
equivalent of $333,333.33. But German Bank did not feel the loss in
terms of dollars. On judgment day, when the value of the dollar had
further depreciated to only DM 2, a damage award of $333,333.33 would
not adequately compensate German Bank. Such an award would only
compensate German Bank for two-thirds of its loss. Therefore, in juris-
dictions without the home currency judgment rule, the contract should
stipulate that damages from exchange loss are to be awarded in the form
of currency intended to be used by the injured party. In the above exam-
ple, German Bank would simply receive DM 1,000,000, no matter what
the cost to the delaying party. 133
131 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
132 In other words, the court can simply order that judgment be executed in the home currency in
an amount equivalent to DM 1,000,000 according to the prevailing exchange rates when payment is
made.
133 Such an approach may be thought to encourage delays where the transferor's currency is
appreciating against the transferee's. The longer the transferor waits to pay, the less it must eventu-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:759(1988)
In jurisdictions employing the home currency judgment rule, the
contract may have to be exceedingly more complicated. While the judg-
ment-date rule will never apply, 134 five factors affect whether the breach-
date or execution-date rule is the most equitable in a given situation:
1) whether the home currency is the transferor's currency or the trans-
feree's currency; 2) whether the payment obligation is denominated in
the home currency or the other currency; 3) whether the transferee in-
tends to convert the transferred currency upon receipt; 4) which party
suffered the exchange loss; and 5) whether the exchange loss results from
a depreciating or an appreciating currency. To simplify matters, the con-
tract can simply state that "the most equitable rule" is to apply, with
equity defined as compensating the injured party in a home currency
amount equivalent to the foreign currency loss felt by the injured party.
In the above example, the execution-date rule would be the most equita-
ble, compensating German Bank the home currency value of DM
1,000,000 on the date of execution and thereby enabling it immediately to
convert the award into the amount of deutschemarks in which it felt the
loss.
2. Enforceability of the Model Contract
It is unclear at this time whether courts would enforce such a con-
tract as proposed here. It appears, based on Delbrueck .3 and basic con-
tract law, that United States courts would be willing to enforce at least
the substantive provisions of such a contract. The British House of
Lords decision in Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. 136 indicates
that the courts of the United Kingdom would be willing to enforce the
ally pay in terms of its own currency. This is not the case for two reasons. First, the transferor
usually cannot be certain as to the intended use of the transferee. If the transferee intends to utilize
the currency sent, the failure of the transferor to pay when due will not alter its obligation to pay the
same amount later, plus interest losses. See supra text accompanying note 49.
Second, the transferor's payment obligation is often denominated in the transferor's currency.
In this case, even if the transferee intends to exchange the currency upon receipt, the transferor is
precluded from intentionally delaying the transfer in the hopes of paying less later simply because he
is obligated to pay a sum certain in its own currency. As a result, delay can only give rise to poten-
tial interest and exchange losses, rather than exchange gains.
In sum, the only circumstance in which the transferor may have incentive to delay is when all of
the following factors apply: 1) the payment obligation is denominated in the transferee's currency;
2) transferee has agreed to accept payment in an alternate currency; 3) the transferor is certain as to
the transferee's intent to transfer any alternate currency, upon receipt, into its own currency; and
4) any potential interest loss liability for delayed payment is less than expected exchange gains. Such
a circumstance is not likely to arise very often, for obvious reasons.
134 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
135 609 F.2d 1047.
136 1976 A.C. 443.
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procedural provisions. 13 7 Apparently, the United Kingdom courts would
also be more willing to accept the substantive provisions of the contract
than United States courts would be willing to accept the procedural
provisions. 13
Regardless of strict enforceability, however, the merits of this model
contract lie in its uniformity of results rather than operational consis-
tency.139 Even through application of its archaic rules, United States
courts can arrive at the same results as would be provided by strict en-
forcement of the model contract provisions. Specifically, the United
States courts can effectively apply the execution-date rule by either order-
ing execution of its judgment to take place on the judgment date, or re-
serving final judgment until execution can be made.1" As mentioned
above,141 United States courts can avoid the home currency judgment
rule by paying the injured party the value, in dollars, of the loss felt in
the foreign currency. Thus, while the contract may not be specifically
enforceable in many jurisdictions, the intended effect of the contract may
be realized as long as courts adhere to the purpose and goals of the
contract.
B. The Independent Tribunal
The second proposed modification would provide for a single in-
137 The House of Lords granted a Swiss plaintiff an award in Swiss francs for damages suffered as
a result of a British defendant's breach of a contract governed by Swiss law. The obligation was
expressly to be made in Swiss francs.
Miliangos has been extended from the denomination of damages for breach of contract to per-
sonal and property damages arising from claims in torts, debts due, restitution awards under a
British statute governing frustration of contract, and liquidated or unliquidated damages arising
from contracts governed by British law. Consequently, it is now a general rule that when judg-
ment in a foreign currency is appropriate, a British court will grant such a judgment and deter-
mine conversion rates as of the actual date of payment, or, if necessary, the date on which the
court authorizes enforcement of the judgment.
N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 22, at 795.
138 This is because present application of the breach-date and judgment-date rules by the federal
courts is based on a long.line of Supreme Court precedent, see supra note 23, as is application of the
home currency judgment rule, see supra note 22. While both practices have been repeatedly con-
demned, see generally Brand, supra note 22; N. Y Bar Report, supra note 22; Comment, Conversion of
Judgments, supra note 19, they have not yet been discarded. The English courts are likely to accept
the substantive provisions of the model contract because, based on the decision in Federal Com-
merce & Navigation Co. v. Tradex Export (The Martha Envoy"), 1977 Q.B. 324 (C.A.), rev'd on
other grounds, 1978 A.C. 1, 1977 [3] WLR 126 (H.L.), the courts have already shown a willingness
to enforce contractual provisions denominating the form of currency in a transaction.
139 The rules may not be enforced as they were intended, but as long as the courts of the various
jurisdictions reach the same results in cases having the same facts, the purpose of the uniform rules
will have been met.
140 In these cases, the courts would technically be applying its mandated judgment-date rule
while effectively producing execution-date results.
141 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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dependent forum to adjudicate all claims arising from a SWIFT trans-
fer.' 42 SWIFT would no longer hear claims against itself. After the
applicable exchange rule is determined, all exchange loss problems in
SWIFT transactions would be resolved in the same forum, applying the
properly identified rule. Nothing could be more uniform nor easier to
administer. Thus, the inquiry into the exchange problem as it affects
SWIFT transactions would be at an end. Nonetheless, two questions are
raised by the provision of an independent forum. First, would the deci-
sions of the independent forum be held enforceable by the interested state
and national courts having concurrent jurisdiction over such claims?
Second, could the independent forum's jurisdiction be extended to the
adjudication of all EFT disputes, including those effectuated through net-
works other than SWIFT?.143
The Delbruek '4 decision suggests that, to the extent the establish-
ment of an independent forum is a matter of contract between member
banks and SWIFT, the decisions of the independent forum would be
given force of law. Use of an independent tribunal is analogous to any
contract stipulating arbitration for settlement disputes between the con-
tracting parties, with the independent SWIFT forum here acting as the
arbitrator. As such, it is likely that any court with jurisdiction over
claims adjudicated by the independent forum will uphold its decisions.
When extending adjudication to all EFT disputes, including those
not utilizing SWIFT, however, the question arises whether an interna-
tional tribunal with jurisdiction over only one subject matter can ever be
created, and if so on what basis and under what authority. Conceivably,
all banks engaged in EFTs can agree to submit themselves to the jurisdic-
142 International courts and tribunals ("ICTs") are generally concerned only with public interna-
tional law, and those that presently exist "have nearly all been established on the basis of multilateral
international treaties." Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Settlement of Disputes) 92, 93 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1981). Since
SWIFT is a private organization, it is doubtful that a multinational agreement establishing an ICT to
settle these essentially private disputes will be reached. What is contemplated here is not so much an
international tribunal that will apply international law, but an independent tribunal whose task is to
adjudicate disputes between member banks of different nations, or between member banks and
SWIFr, using an established set of procedural rules. These rules would be established by agreement
of all present and future member banks, and would include rules such as those set out in the model
contract. See supra text accompanying notes 116-34. The important element, however, is that
SWIF itself, inasmuch as it may be a party to a claim, have no part in its adjudication.
143 Obviously, other networks could each provide for their own independent forums. Such an
approach would certainly be costly. Moreover, such an approach could also lead to adjudicative
competition at the expense of fairness. If the independent court of one network rules in favor of the
receiving bank in a dispute, the court of another network would have incentive to rule for the send-
ing bank in an identical circumstance. As it is the sending bank that normally chooses the network,
the latter network above would obviously then be in the more favorable position.
144 See supra notes 79, 80 and accompanying text.
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tion of the independent forum, as can all of the networks. The problem,
however, is that certain networks may not agree to submit to the in-
dependent forum's jurisdiction for fear of their own potential liabilities.
These networks may thus seek to establish their own tribunal or other
adjudicatory process.145
The problems associated with different networks having different fo-
rums, however, may be no more significant than those associated with
different networks having different model contracts. The primary con-
cern is not that all nations treat all EFTs effectuated through all net-
works in exactly the same way, but that all nations treat all EFTs in any
one network in a consistent manner. Since the members of any one net-
work will know what to expect when they use that network, choice-of-
law problems will not arise. There is, however, the potential problem of
inconsistent rules between multiple networks used in the same transfer.
While this potential problem may not be inconsequential, it should not
pose a barrier to the establishment of network forums. The SWIFT and
CHIPS networks are presently used in the same transaction quite
often,146 and to date there have been no reported cases detailing a conflict
in their joint use. To the extent this problem may arise, however, a single
"international" forum with jurisdiction over all EFTs may be better
suited to handle EFT claims than are numerous network forums. Inas-
much as this alternative may not presently be viable, the multiple net-
work forums should, at least temporarily, adequately resolve most EFT
exchange loss disputes.
In order for there to be a single "international" forum with jurisdic-
tion over all EFTs regardless of the network utilized, either every bank
engaged in EFTs or every nation in which those banks are located would
have to sanction that forum's authority.147 Neither is likely to occur in
the near future. On the one hand, it can be expected that existing net-
works will combat any attempts to usurp authority over its own trans-
fers. Consequently, the banks that are members of existing networks will
refuse to submit to the forum's jurisdiction. On the other hand, state
recognition of an international forum would necessitate either a multina-
tional agreement or independent national legislation in each nation hav-
ing banks engaged in EFTs. Either of these would be extremely difficult
to achieve in light of the recent conclusion of the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law ("UNICTRAL") that "[i]t would be
premature ... to attempt to unify the law in respect of electronic fund
145 See supra note 143.
146 See supra note 3.
147 Tomuschat, supra note 142, at 93. See supra note 142.
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transfers at present." '148 While uniform national legislation is a viable
alternative for the future, t 49 for the present it holds little hope. SWIFT
alone, for example, has members from over forty nations. Since no na-
tion has yet passed legislation dealing with international EFTs in general,
it is unlikely that over forty could be expected to pass this more specific
legislation in the near future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The implementation of model contracts or the establishment of in-
dependent network tribunals could provide numerous benefits in easing
the recovery of exchange losses suffered in delayed EFTs. These include:
1) a reduction in forum shopping---either an independent forum will be
mandated by contract, or all forums would be mandated by contract to
implement the same substantive and procedural rules; 2) more certainty
in foreign exchange dealings through EFTs; 3) a reduction in float activ-
ity,150 as parties would hesitate to delay in transferring money for fear of
exchange loss reprisals;15 and 4) a reduction in the need for parties to
resort to litigation as clear rules governing liability develop over time.' 5
2
Finally, the fact that injured parties would receive compensation for
delayed transfers would lead to increasingly efficient procedures and de-
velopments in the EFT field.
Clearly UNCITRAL was mistaken in concluding that technological
advances preclude unification of the law with respect to EFTs. 153 Im-
proved technology does not render good law bad, rather it improves good
law by broadening its reach. As technologies improve, the procedures
employed by organizations such as SWIFT and CHIPS may change, the
148 Secretary General's Report, supra note 9. See supra note 9.
149 See generally Comment, Risk Allocation, supra note 2, at 652-58. Principles already devel-
oped with respect to Giro accounts may provide a framework through which some EFT disputes
may be effectively resolved. The word "giro" is taken from the greek word "gyro," meaning circle,
and describes payment systems in which the customers themselves initiate and control payments
from their own financial accounts. Vergari, Electronic GIRO for the United States, 6 COMPUTER
L.J. 101, 102 n.5 (1980). For a comparison of the Giro system and EFTs, see Ellinger, The Giro
System and Electronic Transfers of Funds, 2 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L. 178 (May 1986). For a
discussion concerning the development of a possible electronic Giro system, and the interrelation
between Giro and EFTs, see Vergari, supra, at 101; White, The Coming Credit: The Developing
Electronic GIRO Capability, MAG. BANK ADMIN., Dec. 1975, at 34.
150 See supra note 14.
151 The speed of EFTs alone has, already resulted in substantial reductions in float. Byler &
Baker, supra note 3, at 462.
152 At the outset, banks may bring many more lawsuits solely for the purpose of collecting on
exchange losses. As clear liability rules develop, however, exchange losses should occur less fre-
quently due to broad-based compliance, and hence the number of suits should decline.
153 See supra note 9.
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period of time in which a transfer can be completed may be shortened,
and the risks of error and delay may be diminished. However, such im-
provements cannot impair the effectiveness of rules and laws which place
liability on fault, measure delays with recourse to discrete and necessary
events, and impose liability only to provide equity. While it may be too
early to draft international legislation, or grant an international court
exclusive jurisdiction over EFT exchange problems, these limitations are
due to inherent weaknesses in the international system rather than to the
complexity of EFT problems.
The exchange problems created by EFTs are fairly complex, but
uniform rules can, if not resolve them, at least pave the way for their
resolution. For now, uniform standards can best be applied through the
organizations that fostered the growth of EFTs. Ultimately, through ac-
ceptance of these standards by the courts or legislatures of individual
nations, these standards can be termed international. It is up to SWIFT
and CHIPS, however, to make the first move.
John S. Santa Lucia

